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SLAPPing Around the First Amendment: An Analysis of
Oklahoma’s Anti-SLAPP Statute and Its Implications on
the Right to Petition
[F]ree speech, free press, free religion, the right of free assembly,
yes, the right of petition . . . well, they are still radical ideas.1
— Lyndon B. Johnson
I. Introduction
Many states are beginning to take note of a troubling trend in litigation that
devastates First Amendment rights. This litigation, termed Strategic Lawsuits
Against Public Participation (SLAPP suits),2 consists of lawsuits filed against
individuals who communicate with or try to influence the government.3
SLAPP suits differ from ordinary contract and tort lawsuits in that they are
simply a reaction to political action.4 They dissuade public activism such as
testifying against real estate development at a zoning hearing,5 complaining to
a school board about unfit teachers,6 or demonstrating peacefully for or against
government actions.7 While the First Amendment guarantees citizens the right
to petition their government for redress of grievances, SLAPP suits effectively
chill petitioning activities by subjecting citizens who exercise their right to the
fear and intimidation of litigation.8 As a result, many states are responding by
enacting some form of judicial or legislative remedy to combat these suits.

1. Lyndon B. Johnson, Remarks to the International Platform Association Upon Receiving
the Association’s Annual Award (Aug. 3, 1965).
2. Professors Pring and Canan of the University of Denver are two of the primary analysts
of this legal phenomenon. They coined the term “SLAPP” and initiated a detailed analysis of
the SLAPP trend. GEORGE W. PRING & PENELOPE CANAN, SLAPPS: GETTING SUED FOR
SPEAKING OUT 3 (1996).
3. Penelope Canan & George W. Pring, Studying Strategic Lawsuits Against Public
Participation: Mixing Quantitative and Qualitative Approaches, 22 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 385,
386 (1988).
4. PRING & CANAN, supra note 2, at 8; see also Duracraft Corp. v. Holmes Prod. Corp.,
691 N.E.2d 935, 940 (Mass. 1998).
5. See Gorman Towers v. Bogoslavsky, 626 F.2d 607 (8th Cir. 1980); Weiss v. Willow
Tree Civic Ass’n, 467 F. Supp. 803 (S.D.N.Y. 1979).
6. See Martin v. Kearney, 124 Cal. Rptr. 281 (Cal. Ct. App. 1975); Weissman v. Mogol,
462 N.Y.S.2d 383 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1983).
7. See County of San Luis Obispo v. Abalone Alliance, 223 Cal. Rptr. 846 (Cal. Ct. App.
1986); N. Star Legal Found. v. Honeywell Project, 355 N.W.2d 186 (Minn. Ct. App. 1984).
8. U.S. CONST. amend. I (“Congress shall make no law . . . abridging . . . the right of the
people . . . to petition the Government for a redress of grievances.”).
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The defining characteristic of a SLAPP suit is its purpose to deter public
participation in decision-making forums. Accordingly, SLAPP suits
encompass many forms of litigation, including both direct lawsuits and
counterclaims or cross-claims to existing lawsuits.9 For example, a
counterclaim alleging defamation might arise in an unfair business practice
suit. If the purpose of the counterclaim is to make the original plaintiff
withdraw the suit, then the counterclaim is a SLAPP suit.10 Due to the many
forms a SLAPP suit may take, scholars and litigators often refer to those
involved in SLAPP suits as “filers” and “targets” instead of “plaintiffs” and
“defendants.”11
Generally, filers of SLAPP suits are well-financed
organizations, and targets are private citizens or groups “whose political
activism may be detrimental to the organization's business interests.”12
Because SLAPP suit filers must camouflage their grievances against the
targets’ petitioning activities, five recognized causes of action are typically
used for SLAPP suit litigation: defamation, business torts, process violations,
conspiracy, and constitutional and civil rights violations.13 Other less common
causes of action may include violations such as nuisance, trespass, and
emotional harms.14 A nationwide study of SLAPP suit litigation identified
defamation in the form of libel, slander, and business libel as the most
common cause of action.15 Business torts, the second most common cause of
action, include interference with contract or business, antitrust, restraint of
trade, and unfair competition.16
Courts typically dismiss most SLAPP suits because of their infringements
on the First Amendment Right to Petition;17 however, the primary objective of
SLAPP suits is not to win. Instead of achieving victory in court, SLAPP suits
are designed to intimidate the petitioners into dropping their initial petitions
due to the expense and fear of extended litigation.18 While legitimate litigation
9. PRING & CANAN, supra note 2, at 9-10.
10. Simmons v. Allstate Ins. Co., 112 Cal. Rptr. 2d 397, 398 (Cal. Ct. App. 2001).
11. PRING & CANAN, supra note 2, at 9-10.
12. Victor J. Cosentino, Strategic Lawsuits Against Public Participation: An Analysis of
the Solutions, 27 CAL. W. L. REV. 399, 402 (1991). Real estate developers, property owners,
police officers, public utility companies, and state and local governments frequently file SLAPP
suits. Canan & Pring, supra note 3, at 389.
13. PRING & CANAN, supra note 2, at 217.
14. Id.
15. Id.
16. Id.
17. U.S. CONST. amend. I.
18. See United States v. Lockheed Missiles & Space Co., 190 F.3d 963, 970-71 (9th Cir.
1999); Wilcox v. Superior Court, 33 Cal. Rptr. 2d 446, 450 (Cal. Ct. App. 1994), overruled on
other grounds by Equilon Enters. v. Consumer Cause, 52 P.3d 685 (Cal. 2002).
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serves to obtain compensation or to right a wrong, the primary motivation
behind filing SLAPP suits is to retaliate against successful opposition and
prevent future opposition.19 It has been noted that, “One would be hardpressed to find another area of law in which so overwhelming a proportion of
defendants brought into court are eventually vindicated.”20 Nevertheless,
despite a victory in court, the targets of SLAPP suits must hire lawyers, spend
time answering complaints, and deal with burdensome discovery requests. In
addition, an overwhelming number of petitioners drop their original petition.21
Thus, filers achieve success through the withdrawal of the targets’ petitions,
or, when the cases have already been resolved in a manner detrimental to the
filers, success comes in the form of a chill on future petitioning.22
The presence of these ulterior motives confounds established litigation
procedures and safeguards, such as fines, sanctions, and unfavorable decisions
designed to prevent abuse and manipulation of the legal system.23 Because
filers of SLAPP suits look to intimidate the targets rather than win the
lawsuits, unfavorable decisions do little to control or prevent filers from suing
the petitioners.24 Often filers are trying to protect large business deals from the
targets’ blocking strategies.25 If the business incentives outweigh the sanctions
for filing frivolous lawsuits, then fines will do little to discourage filing
SLAPP suits. Thus, absent additional legislation specifically directed toward
SLAPP suits, abuse and manipulation of the legal system will continue
unconstrained.
Although SLAPP suits are by no means a new phenomenon in business and
political litigation, states have only recently begun to enact legislation geared
at defining and dealing with SLAPP suits.26 California has spearheaded the
effort with some of the most comprehensive legislation and case law.27 Based
19. Penelope Canan, The SLAPP from a Sociological Perspective, 7 PACE ENVTL. L. REV.
23, 30 (1989) (describing filers’ primary motives as: “(1) the intent to retaliate for successful
opposition on an issue of public interest; (2) the attempt to prevent expected future, competent
opposition on subsequent public policy issues; (3) the intent to intimidate and, generally, to send
a message that opposition will be punished; and (4) a view of litigation and the use of the court
system as simply another tool in a strategy to win a political and/or economic battle”).
20. Edmond Costantini & Mary Paul Nash, SLAPP/SLAPPBACK: The Misuse of Libel Law
for Political Purposes and a Countersuit Response, 7 J.L. & POL. 417, 420 (1991).
21. Lori Potter, Strategic Lawsuits Against Public Participation and Petition Clause
Immunity, 31 ENVTL. L. REP. 10,852, 10,853 (2001); PRING & CANAN, supra note 2, at 2.
22. Cosentino, supra note 12, at 403.
23. Id.
24. Id.
25. Id. at 402.
26. PRING & CANAN, supra note 2, at 189 (noting these types of laws are often referred to
as “anti-SLAPP” laws).
27. CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 425.16 (West 2006); see also California Anti-SLAPP Project,
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on California’s lead, twenty-three other states have enacted legislation with
varying degrees of protection for SLAPP suit targets.28 Some states, like
Oklahoma, limit the statute’s application to a specific cause of action, such as
defamation, and do not provide procedural shortcuts for handling suits.29
Other states provide more comprehensive procedural mechanisms to
effectively deal with SLAPP suits such as special motions to dismiss,
procedures to stay discovery, and the shifting of attorney fees, without
restricting the cause of action.30
Because of the potentially devastating chill effect SLAPP suits have on the
constitutional right to petition the government, state legislative action is
required to combat their ill effects. Legislation should articulate a clear
definition of SLAPP suits and provide a remedy for quick and easy disposal
of such suits so that citizens feel free to campaign against ballot issues,
demonstrate peacefully, file complaints to government offices, and report
official misconduct.31 Although an increasing number of states are recognizing
the need for such legislation, Oklahoma’s anti-SLAPP statute remains
ineffective and continues to lack the elements necessary to successfully
combat SLAPP suits.
This note analyzes how the limited scope of Oklahoma’s anti-SLAPP
statute hinders the First Amendment Right to Petition by not providing SLAPP
suit targets proper procedural shortcuts to easily dispose of improper suits.
Part II of this note examines how the Supreme Court and other states have
addressed SLAPP suits through an expansive reading of the Noerr-Pennington
http://www.casp.net/calstats.html (last visited Feb. 12, 2007).
28. ARK. CODE ANN. §§ 16-63-501 to -508 (2006); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 10, §§ 8136-8138
(2001); FLA. STAT. § 768.295 (2005); GA. CODE ANN. § 9-11-11.1 (2003); HAW. REV. STAT.
§ 634F (2005); IND. CODE §§ 34-7-7-1 to -10 (1998); LA. CODE CIV. PROC. ANN. art. 971
(2000); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 14, § 556 (2003); MD. CODE ANN., CTS. & JUD. PROC. § 5-807
(LexisNexis Supp. 2006); MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 231, § 59H (2000); MINN. STAT. §§ 554.01 to
-.05 (2000); MO. REV. STAT. § 537.528 (Supp. 2006); NEB. REV. STAT. §§ 25-21-241 to -246
(1995); NEV. REV. STAT. §§ 41.635 to -.670 (2005); N.M. STAT. §§ 38-2-9.1 to -9.2 (Supp.
2006); N.Y. C.P.L.R. 3211(g) (McKinney 2004); 12 OKLA. STAT. § 1443.1 (2001); OR. REV.
STAT. §§ 31.150 to .155 (2005); 27 PA. CONS. STAT. §§ 7707, 8301-8305 (2000); R.I. GEN.
LAWS §§ 9-33-1 to -4 (1997); TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 4-21-1001 to -1003 (2005); UTAH CODE
ANN. §§ 78-58-101 to -105 (2003); WASH. REV. CODE §§ 4.24.500 to .520 (2005).
29. 12 OKLA. STAT. § 1443.1; see also DEL. CODE ANN. § 8136(1) (limiting their protection
to applicants for public permits); FLA. STAT. § 768.295(2) (limiting the prohibition of SLAPP
suits to those filed by governmental entities); 27 PA. CONS. STAT. §§ 7707, 8301-8305 (limiting
immunity to those petitioning for environmental causes).
30. See, e.g., CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 425.16; GA. CODE ANN. § 9-11-11.1; HAW. REV.
STAT. § 634F; MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 231, § 59H; MO. REV. STAT. § 537.528; R.I. GEN. LAWS
§§ 9-33-1 to -4.
31. See generally PRING & CANAN, supra note 2, at 2.
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Doctrine and through individual state statutes. Part III examines how
Oklahoma has addressed SLAPP suits through its statute and case law. Part
IV analyzes the weaknesses of Oklahoma’s statute and suggests that Oklahoma
adopt a more expansive recognition of SLAPP suits by not limiting them to
defamation causes of action. In addition, Part IV includes suggested
procedures for SLAPP suits such as a special motion to dismiss, a stay of
discovery upon the filing of a motion to strike, shifting attorney fees, and an
authorization for SLAPP-back suits. This note concludes in Part V.
II. Guarding the First Amendment: Development of Petition Clause
Immunity and SLAPP Suit Protection
For the first two centuries after the enactment of the First Amendment,
defendants rarely used the Petition Clause as a litigation defense.32 Not until
the early 1960s did the Supreme Court officially recognize petition clause
immunity in limited situations.33 The Supreme Court created this immunity,
often called the Noerr-Pennington Doctrine (the Doctrine), when it held that
an antitrust exemption exists for activities involving the petitioning of
governmental bodies.34 Eventually, the applicability of the Doctrine spread
beyond the antitrust arena and became a defense to a wide variety of suits.35
Nevertheless, although the Doctrine provides a defense to cases in which the
plaintiff sues the defendant for petitioning, the Doctrine does little to
discourage plaintiffs from filing such suits in the first place. States are
therefore working to fill this void and discourage the suits through judicial
remedies and, more commonly, state statutes.
A. Supreme Court Development of the Noerr-Pennington Doctrine
The Noerr-Pennington Doctrine states that the Constitution’s Petition
Clause protects efforts to influence the government through petitioning, even

32. Id. at 18; see, e.g., White v. Nicholls, 44 U.S. (3 How.) 266 (1845) (stating that a citizen
was sued for complaining to the U.S. President about malfeasance by a customs collector); Gray
v. Pentland, 2 Serg. & Rawle 23 (Penn. 1815) (stating that a citizen was sued for a deposition
to the governor charging a government official with frequent intoxication and being unfit to
perform duties of office with dignity); Larkin v. Noonan, 19 Wis. 82 (1865) (stating that a
citizen was sued for reporting to the governor that a sheriff tried to defraud the county).
33. Potter, supra note 21, at 10,853.
34. Cal. Motor Transp. Co. v. Trucking Unlimited, 404 U.S. 508, 509-10 (1972); United
Mine Workers v. Pennington, 381 U.S. 657, 669 (1965); E. R.R. Presidents Conference v. Noerr
Motor Freight, 365 U.S. 127, 136 (1961).
35. Prof’l Real Estate Investors v. Columbia Pictures Indus., 508 U.S. 49, 59 (1993);
NAACP v. Claiborne Hardware Co., 458 U.S. 886, 913-14 (1982).
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if the petitioning is for an anticompetitive purpose.36 While normal antitrust
law prohibits business practices that may create unfair competition, the First
Amendment Right to Petition the Government prevents lawsuits against
certain business practices if the “business practice” is some sort of petitioning
activity.37 If a company asks a court or government official to enact a law that
would ultimately stifle its competition, it is not violating antitrust laws because
the First Amendment protects “asking the government” as a form of
petitioning.38 Even if the motive of the petition is to stifle competition, the
right to petition outweighs the policy of promoting fair and equal business
practices.39
The Supreme Court articulated the principles for a Petition Clause defense
and thereby established the Noerr-Pennington Doctrine in a series of three
related cases.40 In Eastern Railroad Presidents Conference v. Noerr Motor
Freight, a trucking company sued to stop a railroad’s publicity campaign
aimed at obtaining federal legislative action against the interest of trucking
companies.41 The Supreme Court held that this attempt did not violate the
Sherman Antitrust Act even if the objective of obtaining government action
was for an anticompetitive purpose.42 The Court viewed this publicity
campaign as a petition to the legislature, and held that a law discouraging anticompetitive activity could not hinder the right to petition.43
In United Mine Workers of America v. Pennington, the Supreme Court
further utilized the Doctrine and expanded it to protect petitioning the
executive branch. In Pennington, a union approached the Secretary of Labor
seeking inclusion in an act that would establish a minimum wage law, making
it hard for small companies to compete in the long-distance freight
transportation market.44 A small coalmine operator sued the union for
violating the Antitrust Act.45 As in Noerr Motor Freight, the Court held that
petitioning the executive for the enforcement of laws did not violate the

36. Cal. Motor Transp., 404 U.S. at 509-10; Pennington, 381 U.S. at 669; Noerr Motor
Freight, 365 U.S. at 136.
37. Noerr Motor Freight, 365 U.S. at 135-36.
38. Cal. Motor Transp., 404 U.S. at 510-11.
39. Cal. Motor Transp., 404 U.S. at 509-10; Pennington, 381 U.S. at 669; Noerr Motor
Freight, 365 U.S. at 136.
40. Cal. Motor Transp., 404 U.S. 509; Pennington, 381 U.S. 657; Noerr Motor Freight,
365 U.S. 127.
41. 365 U.S. at 138-40.
42. Id.
43. Id.
44. 381 U.S. at 660.
45. Id.
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Antitrust Act.46 The Court upheld the right to petition despite the fact that the
union’s ultimate objective of the petition was to diminish competition.47
Finally, in California Motor Transport Co. v. Trucking Unlimited, the Court
once again extended the Noerr-Pennington Doctrine to apply to petitions for
relief before a court or administrative agency. In California Motor Transport,
a trucking company sought damages and injunctive relief in a lawsuit against
another trucking company.48 Although the trucking company’s lawsuit may
have acted to stifle competition, the Court recognized that the lawsuit was a
form of petitioning and the trucking company that filed the initial suit for
damages and injunctive relief was immune from a retaliatory suit based on the
First Amendment’s right to petition as well as the right of free association.49
Together, these three cases establish that the right to petition the government
may not be undermined even if the purpose of the petition is to stifle
competition.
B. Expansion of the Noerr-Pennington Doctrine Beyond the Antitrust Arena
The Noerr-Pennington line of cases solely addresses antitrust litigation, but
the Supreme Court has acknowledged that the Doctrine has broader
application.50 For example, in NAACP v. Claiborne Hardware Co., the Court
applied the Doctrine to civil rights cases.51 In Claiborne Hardware, a boycott
seen as a legitimate form of petitioning activity did not seek to destroy
competition; rather, the purpose was to vindicate civil rights.52 The Court
stressed that the non-violent boycott aimed at protesting racial discrimination
goes to the core of First Amendment values.53 Applying the Noerr-Pennington
Doctrine, the Court upheld the boycott as a legitimate form of petitioning
activity.54 Like in Noerr Motor Freight, the Court held that even if the
foreseeable intent of the boycott is to impact economic activity, the boycott
may not be undercut by laws regulating economic activity as long as the
purpose is to influence state actors.55
46. Id. at 671.
47. Id.
48. 404 U.S. 508, 509 (1972).
49. Id. at 510.
50. See Prof’l Real Estate Investors v. Columbia Pictures Indus., 508 U.S. 49, 59 (1993)
(“Whether applying Noerr as an antitrust doctrine or invoking it in other contexts, we have
repeatedly reaffirmed that evidence of anticompetitive intent or purpose alone cannot transform
otherwise legitimate activity into a sham.”).
51. 458 U.S. 886, 913-14 (1982).
52. Id. at 914.
53. Id. at 915.
54. Id.
55. Id. at 914.
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Expanding the Supreme Court’s broad recognition of the Doctrine, lower
courts have applied the Doctrine to a wide variety of petitioning activities.
Several lower courts have held that those who petition the government seeking
redress should not, in turn, be subjected to retaliatory litigation, whether the
petition involves antitrust issues or not.56 For example, in Ludwig v. Superior
Court, the California Court of Appeals held that the Noerr-Pennington
Doctrine applies to “virtually any tort, including unfair competition and
interference with contract, commercial speech,” and to both competitive and
anticompetitive activity.57 In Alfred Weissman Real Estate v. Big V
Supermarkets, Inc., the New York Supreme Court Appellate Division held that
the Doctrine applies to claims brought under both federal and state law.58
Thus, as applied by the Supreme Court and the lower courts, the Doctrine now
applies to petitions in all areas of the government, including local
governments,59 and can provide immunity from suit in a variety of contexts.60
C. Recognition of SLAPP Suits
The Noerr-Pennington Doctrine establishes the foundation for recognizing
petition clause immunity and provides a concrete defense for a wide variety of
business and tort cases.61 On the heels of the Noerr-Pennington line of cases,
56. See Reichenberger v. Pritchard, 660 F.2d 280, 288 (7th Cir. 1981); Edmondson &
Gallagher v. Alban Towers Tenants Ass’n, 829 F. Supp. 420, 426 (D.D.C. 1993), rev’d on other
grounds, 48 F.3d 1260 (D.C. Cir. 1995); Westfield Partners v. Hogan, 740 F. Supp. 523, 526
(N.D. Ill. 1990); Weiss v. Willow Tree Civic Ass’n, 467 F. Supp. 803, 816-18 (S.D.N.Y. 1979);
Aknin v. Phillips, 404 F. Supp. 1150, 1153 (S.D.N.Y. 1975).
57. 43 Cal. Rptr. 2d 350, 360 n.17 (Cal. Ct. App. 1995); see also Zeller v. Consolini, 758
A.2d 376, 380 (Conn. App. Ct. 2000) (stating that the Noerr-Pennington Doctrine “is equally
applicable to many types of claims which seek to assign liability on the basis of the defendant's
exercise of its first amendment rights”).
58. 707 N.Y.S.2d 647, 652 (N.Y. App. Div. 2000); see also Video Int’l Prod. v. WarnerAmex Cable Commc’ns, 858 F.2d 1075, 1084 (5th Cir. 1988); Hamilton v. Accu-Tek, 935 F.
Supp. 1307, 1317 (E.D.N.Y. 1996).
59. Columbia v. Omni Outdoor Adver., Inc., 499 U.S. 365, 379-80 (1991) (granting NoerrPennington immunity for efforts to influence local government); Monarch Entm’t Bureau v.
N.J. Highway Auth., 715 F. Supp. 1290, 1301-03 (D.N.J. 1989); Zeller, 758 A.2d at 381.
60. See, e.g., Zeller, 758 A.2d at 384 (applying the Noerr-Pennington Doctrine to zoning
permit challenges); Tremaine v. Tremaine, No. 960149564S, 1997 WL 139422, at *2 (Conn.
Super. Ct. 1997) (holding that the Noerr-Pennington Doctrine applies to petitions for alimony
and does not bar a husband’s suit against his wife for damages and attorney fees for their
divorce); Azzar v. Primebank, 499 N.W.2d 793, 796 (Mich. Ct. App. 1993) (applying the
Noerr-Pennington Doctrine to a suit against a bank for an alleged breach of fiduciary duty);
Pillar Corp. v. Enercon Indus. Corp., No. 636-912, 1986 WL 22188, at *13 (Wis. Cir. Ct. 1986)
(holding that the Noerr-Pennington Doctrine applies to suits to prevent an employee from
disclosing potential trade secrets).
61. See Potter, supra note 21, at 10,853.
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however, scholars and litigators noted that a growing caseload of defamation,
business interference, and conspiracy torts shared a common feature — they
were filed as a tactical strategy to frustrate public law concerns by
discouraging petitions to the government.62 While petition clause immunity
effectively prevented most of these suits from persevering in court, the fact
that defendants were continually brought to court simply for filing petitions
alerted scholars to the escalating trend of SLAPP suits.63
SLAPP suit filers often successfully chill petitioning activity by
transforming political petitions into legal causes of action.64 Private citizens
can influence the political arena without much risk or expense, but the judicial
system erodes the balance of power between the parties and requires immense
resources.65 Petitioners must shift their focus away from the petitions and
towards funding a legal defense, and lengthy delays in resolving the disputes
cause support for the original petitions to decrease dramatically.66 By using
private tort litigation to shift petitions from the political arena to the legal
forum, SLAPP suit plaintiffs increase the target’s anxiety and risk, effectively
chilling the right to petition.67 Upon review of the detrimental chill effect of
SLAPP suits and the fact that a favorable disposition amounts merely to a
“pyrrhic victory,” Judge J. Nicholas Colabella of the New York Supreme
Court stated, “Short of a gun to the head, a greater threat to First Amendment
expression can scarcely be imagined.”68 Left unregulated, this chill effect not
only stifles the petitioner’s goal of obtaining public and governmental support
for an issue, but also discourages other citizens from exercising their First
Amendment rights for fear of similar suits.
The Colorado Supreme Court’s decision in Protect Our Mountain
Environment v. District Court illuminates the need for SLAPP suit remedies
and provides a framework to counteract the chill on the right to petition.69 In
Mountain Environment, an environmental group protested the development of
a large residential-commercial center in an elk meadow in the mountains west
of Denver.70 The group testified in county hearings and filed an appeal against
the county’s approval in court.71 In return, the development corporation filed

62.
63.
64.
65.
66.
67.
68.
69.
70.
71.

PRING & CANAN, supra note 2, at 3.
See generally id.
Cosentino, supra note 12, at 403.
Id.
Id. at 404.
Id. at 403.
Gordon v. Marrone, 590 N.Y.S.2d 649, 656 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1992).
677 P.2d 1361 (Colo. 1984).
Id. at 1363.
Id. at 1363-64.
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a $40,000,000 abuse of process and conspiracy suit against the group, its
individual members, and its attorneys, arguing that the group’s testimony and
appeal injured the corporation.72 The trial court denied dismissal and the
group appealed based solely on the right to petition.73 In a unanimous opinion,
the court held that to overcome the motion to dismiss, the corporation had the
burden of making a “sufficient showing to permit the court to reasonably
conclude that the [environmental group’s] petitioning activities were not
immunized from liability under the First Amendment.”74 Specifically, the
court created three procedural requirements and three substantive requirements
for managing SLAPP suits.75 Procedurally, every motion to dismiss based on
the Petition Clause is to be fast-tracked for summary judgment, the burden of
proof is shifted from the petitioning group to the entity filing the SLAPP suit,
and a heightened standard of review applies. Substantively, SLAPP suit filers
must prove the petitioner’s activity was devoid of reasonable factual support,
had as its primary purpose harassment or some other improper objective, and
did adversely affect a legal interest of the filer.76 This decision has been cited
as a model approach for early identification and disposition of SLAPP suits,
and has been the basis for some state’s anti-SLAPP laws.77
D. A Legislative Approach to Handling SLAPP Suits
Colorado’s judicial doctrine and the Mountain Environment test establish
a “workable balance between protecting the target’s constitutional petition
rights and the filer’s personal rights.”78 The court effectively removed barriers
to early dismissal by establishing procedures for early identification, burdenshifting, and proof elements.79 Despite Colorado’s sound judicial basis for
dealing with SLAPP suits, case law in other states does not offer a viable
solution for SLAPP suits beyond a mere recognition that they exist. In

72. Id. at 1364.
73. Id.
74. Id. at 1369.
75. Id.; see also George W. Pring & Penelope Canan, Strategic Lawsuits Against Public
Participation (“SLAPPs”): An Introduction for Bench, Bar and Bystanders, 12 BRIDGEPORT
L. REV. 937, 951 (1992).
76. Protect Our Mountain Env’t, 677 P.2d at 1369.
77. See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 10, §§ 8136-8138 (2001); MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 231, §
59H (2000); NEB. REV. STAT. §§ 25-21-241 to -246 (1995); TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 4-21-1001
to -1003 (2005); see also PRING & CANAN, supra note 2, at 199-200; Robert Abrams, Strategic
Lawsuits Against Public Participation (SLAPP), 7 PACE ENVTL. L. REV. 33, 42 (1989).
78. See Pring & Canan, supra note 75, at 953.
79. Id. at 952-53.
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response, many state legislatures have filled the procedural void that case law
has yet to address.80
In 1990, Washington became the first state to enact a statute that
specifically dealt with SLAPP suits.81 Within two years, California and New
York followed Washington’s lead and enacted legislation in response to their
growing state SLAPP litigation.82 Since the enactment of anti-SLAPP statutes
in those three states, identification of SLAPP suits has intensified with many
other states following suit.83 To date, twenty-four states have enacted some
sort of anti-SLAPP legislation since 1990, eight of those within the past five
years.84 In addition to the recent enactment of many state statutes, several
states have already amended their current anti-SLAPP statutes to address
loopholes and concerns identified in case law.85
The legislative approach to dealing with SLAPP suits varies from state to
state, but several core provisions are common to most state laws.86 Professors
Canan and Pring, premier SLAPP suit scholars, explain that, for a legislative
approach to effectively protect public participation in the government, it must
pass a three-part test. First, it must cover “all public advocacy and

80. See ARK. CODE ANN. §§ 16-63-501 to -508 (2006); DEL. CODE. ANN. tit. 10, §§ 81368138; FLA. STAT. § 768.295 (2005); GA. CODE ANN. § 9-11-11.1 (2003); HAW. REV. STAT. §
634F (2005); IND. CODE §§ 34-7-7-1 to -10 (1998); LA. CODE CIV. PROC. ANN. art. 971 (2000);
ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 14, § 556 (2003); MD. CODE ANN., CTS. & JUD. PROC. § 5-807
(LexisNexis Supp. 2006); MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 231, § 59H; MINN. STAT. §§ 554.01 to .05
(2000); MO. REV. STAT. § 537.528 (Supp. 2006); NEB. REV. STAT. §§ 25-21-241 to -246; NEV.
REV. STAT. §§ 41.635 to .670 (2005); N.M. STAT. §§ 38-2-9.1 to -9.2 (Supp. 2006); N.Y.
C.P.L.R. 3211(g) (McKinney 2004); OR. REV. STAT. §§ 31.150 to .155 (2005); 27 PA. CONS.
STAT. §§ 7707, 8301-8305 (2000); R.I. GEN. LAWS §§ 9-33-1 to -4 (1997); TENN. CODE ANN.
§§ 4-21-1001 to -1003; UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 78-58-101 to -105 (2003); WASH. REV. CODE §§
4.24.500 to .520 (2005).
81. WASH. REV. CODE §§ 4.24.500 to .520. The statute was amended in 2002 to set forth
clear dismissal rules. Id.
82. CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 425.16 (West 2006); N.Y. C.P.L.R. 3211(g) (establishing
procedures for early dismissal and summary judgment in SLAPP cases).
83. For a listing of these states’ statutes, see supra note 28.
84. For a state-by-state examination of the anti-SLAPP statutes and amendments, see
California Anti-SLAPP Project, supra note 27. The most recent legislation was enacted by
Arkansas, Missouri, and Pennsylvania in 2005; Maryland in 2004; and Hawaii, New Mexico,
Oregon, and Utah in 2001.
85. See, e.g., CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 425.16 (amended to establish a sixty-day time limit
for a motion to strike and to facilitate recovery of damages for SLAPP-back suits against filers);
NEV. REV. STAT. §§ 41.635 to .670 (amended to expand immunity to any person who engages
in a good faith communication in furtherance of the right to petition); WASH. REV. CODE §§
4.24.500 to .520 (amended to set forth clear rules for early dismissal review).
86. Potter, supra note 21, at 10,856.
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communications to government whether direct or indirect.”87 Second, it must
address all government forums, whether federal, state, local, legislative,
executive, judicial, or the electorate.88 Finally, the legislation must set out
some mode for prevention and cure, such as effective early review and burden
shifting to filers.89 Most statutes address these elements with provisions that
articulate a process for motions to dismiss, allow for expedition of the hearings
for such motions, limit discovery requests until the judge rules on the motions,
and provide for shifting attorney’s fees.90 Other statutes, like Oklahoma’s,
establish a policy point of upholding petition clause immunity, but fail Canan
and Pring’s test by not covering all public advocacy or providing a mode for
prevention and cure.91
III. Relaxing the First Amendment: Oklahoma’s Anti-SLAPP Statute and
Interpretive Case Law
Despite the growing legislative trend toward codifying procedural
mechanisms to combat SLAPP suits, Oklahoma has yet to enact effective
SLAPP suit legislation. The Oklahoma statute commonly referred to as the
anti-SLAPP statute92 was passed in 1981 and is markedly different from other
states’ anti-SLAPP laws.93 Passed nine years before the first SLAPP-specific
87. PRING & CANAN, supra note 2, at 189.
88. Id.
89. Id.
90. Potter, supra note 21, at 10,856; see also PRING & CANAN, supra note 2, at 201-07.
States that include a model approach for prevention and cure include California, New York, and
Minnesota. CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 425.16; N.Y. C.P.L.R. 3211(g) (McKinney 2004); MINN.
STAT. §§ 554.01 to .05 (2000).
91. Oklahoma’s statute fails part one of the test by only preventing libel actions and not
addressing other common SLAPP suit claims such as business torts, civil rights, conspiracy, and
malicious prosecution. 12 OKLA. STAT. § 1443.1 (2001). The statute also fails part three by not
enacting any sort of cure or court review process. Id. Other states with inadequate provisions
to “cure” SLAPP suits include Florida, Pennsylvania, and Tennessee. See FLA. STAT. § 768.295
(2005); 27 PA. CONS. STAT. §§ 7707, 8301-8305 (2000); TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 4-21-1001 to 1003 (2005).
92. See, e.g., California Anti-SLAPP Project, supra note 27; Sheri Coover, Pennsylvania
Anti-SLAPP Legislation, 12 PENN ST. ENVTL. L. REV. 263, 277 (2004); Potter, supra note 21,
at 10,855-56 n.63; Frederick M. Rowe & Leo M. Romero, Resolving Land-Use Disputes by
Intimidation: SLAPP Suits in New Mexico, 32 N.M. L. REV. 217, 217 n.2 (2002); Noah P.
Peeters, Note, Don't Raise That Hand: Why, Under Georgia’s Anti-SLAPP Statute,
Whistleblowers Should Find Protection from Reprisals for Reporting Employer Misconduct, 38
GA. L. REV. 769, 782 n.96 (2004); Scot Wilson, Comment, Corporate Criticism on the Internet:
The Fine Line Between Anonymous Speech and Cybersmear, 29 PEPP. L. REV. 533, 572 n.247
(2002).
93. 12 OKLA. STAT. § 1443.1.
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statute, Oklahoma’s law protects defendants from defamation suits but neither
addresses nor protects against the more general phenomenon of SLAPP suits.94
Nevertheless, while limiting the statute’s applicability to defamation cases,
Oklahoma courts liberally apply the terms in the statute in order to promote the
First Amendment Right to Petition.
A. Oklahoma’s Statutory SLAPP Suit Protections
Oklahoma’s anti-SLAPP statute, section 1443.1 of title 12, provides
immunity from libel suits upon certain conditions, but does not address other
common SLAPP suit causes of action.95 The statute states that, with the
exception of falsely imputing a crime to a public officer, statements made in
or about a legislative, judicial, or other proceeding authorized by law shall not
be punishable as libel.96 Further, the statute protects criticism of the official
acts of public officers.97 For a plaintiff to recover in a libel or defamation suit,
the public official must show actual knowledge of probable falsity prior to the
publication.98 Short of a deliberate factual lie, a plaintiff may not sue a
defendant for defamation even if there were serious doubts as to truth.99
In addition to the immunity defense in section 1443.1, other sections of the
Oklahoma statute may also apply to SLAPP suit litigation. Oklahoma’s
statutes authorize a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim,100 and
possible sanctions for filing frivolous lawsuits.101 Further, section 2011 of title
12 allows judges to shift court costs and attorney fees.102 Unfortunately, these
sections, like section 1443.1, are reactionary and do little to address the unique
problems associated with SLAPP suits. While these sections provide at least
94. Id.
95. Id.
96. Id.
97. Id. Three Oklahoma cases have addressed the issue of what may be considered an act
by a public official. Jurkowski v. Crawley, 1981 OK 110, 637 P.2d 56 (holding that an
accusation about a police officer’s misconduct at a prior job is protected because the accusations
are relevant to the officer’s fitness for office); Winters v. Morgan, 1978 OK 24, 576 P.2d 1152
(holding that statements falsely imputing a crime to an officer are not protected despite being
about the officer’s official duties); Wilson v. City of Tulsa, 2004 OK CIV APP 44, 91 P.3d 673
(holding that a press release alleging theft as a reason for a police officer’s discharge was not
defamatory and was not made through malice because it was made in the furtherance of the
police chief’s official duty).
98. Jurkowski, ¶ 10, 637 P.2d at 60; Wilson, ¶ 22, 91 P.3d at 680; see also N.Y. Times v.
Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 279-80 (1964); Gaylord Entm’t Co. v. Thompson, 1998 OK 30, ¶ 19,
958 P.2d 128, 141-42.
99. Jurkowski, 1981 OK 110, ¶ 13, 637 P.2d at 61.
100. 12 OKLA. STAT. § 2012 (2001).
101. Id. § 2011.
102. Id.
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some minimal remedy to targets of SLAPP suits, they are often burdensome
for the target to pursue and do little to discourage filers from bringing SLAPP
suits in the first place.103
B. Judicial Interpretation
SLAPP suit targets in Oklahoma often view the immunity defense in section
1443.1 as the easiest method to dispose of SLAPP suits.104 Oklahoma courts
recognize the importance of this immunity and have applied the statute
generously. The Oklahoma judiciary has articulated a policy concern for
protecting petitioning activities,105 and has applied this policy by liberally
defining the statutory requirements of section 1443.1 so that the immunity is
available in a wide variety of situations.
1. Oklahoma’s Policy Favoring Citizen Involvement in Public Affairs
The Oklahoma Court of Civil Appeals has repeatedly noted that citizens
should be allowed to question actions by public entities. For example, in
White v. Basnett, a homeowner filed a complaint with the police department
and the FBI alleging that a police officer was abusive.106 In response, the
police officer sued the homeowner for defamation.107 The court found that the
public policy of preventing citizens from being fearful of filing a legitimate
complaint justified the citizen’s absolute immunity from the defamation suit.108
Similarly, the court in Burkett v. Tal addressed the public policy concerns
of protecting communications made in a legislative or judicial proceeding.109
In Burkett, a group of taxpayers filed a written demand with the city clerk of
Oklahoma City alleging illegal appropriation of taxpayer funds for
expenditures benefitting the private company, Bass Pro Outdoor World,
L.L.C.110 The city attorney of Oklahoma City sued the group of taxpayers for
libel in response to their allegations.111 The court held the allegations of illegal
appropriation privileged under the statute because the written demand was a
filing required by law.112 Further, the court noted that the taxpayers deserved
protection from a libel suit because the statute’s purpose was to keep the
103.
104.
105.
106.
107.
108.
109.
110.
111.
112.

Cosentino, supra note 12, at 414-21.
12 OKLA. STAT. § 1443.1.
White v. Basnett, 1985 OK CIV APP 10, ¶ 11, 700 P.2d 666, 668.
Id. at 667.
Id.
Id. at 668.
2004 OK CIV APP 57, ¶ 10, 94 P.3d 114, 117.
Id. at 115.
Id. at 116.
Id. at 117.
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“paths which lead to the ascertainment of truth . . . as free and unobstructed as
possible.”113
The court in White and Burkett protected citizens from retaliatory
defamation suits in order to encourage free speech and petitioning. Other
decisions uphold that policy by broadly defining section 1443.1. Courts
broadly construe the statute’s requirement that statements be “in or about
judicial proceedings,” and liberally define the statutory phrase, “other
proceedings authorized by law.”
2. Oklahoma’s Definition of “Judicial Proceedings”
To encourage witnesses to speak freely without the fear of liability,
Oklahoma courts liberally construe which statements are “in” a judicial
proceeding, which proceedings are “judicial,” and which statements are
“about” a judicial proceeding.114 Oklahoma courts recognize that a statement
may be “in” a judicial proceeding if made during or prior to a judicial
proceeding, as long as the statement in some way relates to the proceeding.115
Statements may be made in an affidavit,116 a pleading,117 a physician’s report
attached to a pleading,118 and a divorce petition.119 The courts also widely
construe “judicial proceeding” by upholding the immunity in hearings before
the University Board of Regents120 and complaints made to a city police
court.121 Likewise, Oklahoma courts protect statements made about a judicial
proceeding via public mediums such as television or newspapers.122 For
example, in Metcalf v. KFOR-TV, a physician sued a television station and
reporter for statements made on television about pending lawsuits.123 The
district court held the station and reporter were immune from suit for

113. Id.; see Briscoe v. LaHue, 460 U.S. 325, 332-34 (1983); Cooper v. Parker-Hughey,
1995 OK 35, ¶ 12, 894 P.2d 1096, 1098-99.
114. Joplin v. Sw. Bell Tel. Co., 753 F.2d 808, 810 (10th Cir. 1983); State ex rel. Okla. Bar
Ass’n v. Dobbs, 2004 OK 46, ¶ 23, 94 P.3d 31, 45.
115. Kirschstein v. Haynes, 1990 OK 8, ¶ 12, 788 P.2d 941, 948; Hammett v. Hunter, 1941
OK 253, ¶ 7, 117 P.2d 511, 512.
116. Kirschstein, ¶ 21, 788 P.2d at 951.
117. Bennett v. McKibben, 1996 OK CIV APP 22, 915 P.2d 400.
118. Pac. Employers Ins. Co. v. Adams, 1946 OK 86, 168 P.2d 105.
119. Pryor v. Findley, 1997 OK CIV APP 74, 949 P.2d 1218.
120. Sanford v. Howard, 1939 OK 343, 95 P.2d 644; Dickerson v. Crozier, 1927 OK 401,
261 P. 545.
121. Dickerson, 1927 OK 401, 261 P. 545.
122. Metcalf v. KFOR-TV, 828 F. Supp. 1515 (W.D. Okla. 1992); McGhee v. Newspaper
Holdings, 2005 OK CIV APP 41, 115 P.3d 896; see also Magnusson v. N.Y. Times Co., 2004
OK 53, ¶ 10, 98 P.3d 1070, 1076-77.
123. 828 F. Supp. at 1526.
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statements that jury selection had begun, that the physician had his license
revoked, and comments regarding details in other lawsuits against the
physician because they were fair and true reports of judicial and quasi-judicial
proceedings.124
3. Oklahoma’s Definition of “Other Proceedings Authorized by Law”
In addition to statements made in and about judicial proceedings,
Oklahoma’s statute protects fair and true reports of any legislative proceeding
or other proceeding authorized by law.125 The Oklahoma Supreme Court
stated in Gaylord Entertainment Co. v. Thompson that political speech must
be “more jealously and intensely guarded than any other form of permissible
expression.”126 To that end, Oklahoma courts recognize an expansive
immunity for speech in contexts outside the judiciary, but relevant to the
political process. Justice Brandeis stated in Whitney v. California, “Those who
won our independence believed that . . . the greatest menace to freedom is an
inert people; that public discussion is a political duty; and that this should be
a fundamental principle of the American government.”127 In Gaylord, Justice
Opala added, “This, we might add, is a fundamental principle of the Oklahoma
government as well.”128
To encourage political activity and public discussion, the Gaylord court
applied section 1443.1 to protect political speech from retaliatory defamation
suits before the targets even filed an initiative petition.129 The protected speech
occurred during the launch of an initiative drive, which, the court held, was an
“essential part of the political process designed ultimately to impact the
government.”130 As with communication made in and about judicial
proceedings, the court held that as long as there was a rational connection
between the comment and the quest for political change, then the statute
protected the communication.131
In addition to speech intended to influence the legislature, section 1443.1
protects speech directed towards a variety of other government offices. In
Metcalf v. KFOR-TV, the court not only addressed whether the statute
protected statements made about a judicial proceeding, but also statements

124.
125.
126.
127.
128.
129.
130.
131.

Id. at 1528.
12 OKLA. STAT. § 1443.1 (2001).
1998 OK 30, ¶ 17, 958 P.2d 128, 141.
274 U.S. 357, 375 (1927) (Brandeis, J., concurring).
¶ 17, 958 P.2d 128, 141 n.41.
Id.
Id. at 140 (emphasis omitted).
Id.
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about other proceedings authorized by law.132 The district court held that the
statute protected statements made on television and shown to the Oklahoma
State Board of Medical Licensure and Supervision in a hearing for the
physician to become board certified in cosmetic breast surgery.133 The court
stated that the board hearing was a “proceeding authorized by law,” and, thus,
the statements were immune from suit.134 Similarly, an Oklahoma district
court upheld immunity for a statement made to the Oklahoma Employment
Commission,135 and the Oklahoma Court of Civil Appeals likewise protected
statements made in a disciplinary proceeding before the Oklahoma State Board
of Dentistry.136 Although section 1443.1 limits protection of statements to
defamation actions only, Oklahoma courts liberally construe the statute’s
applicability to ensure that any statement reasonably intended to have an effect
on a political or judicial action receives that immunity.
IV. SLAPPing Back: Analysis of Oklahoma’s Statute and Call for Change
Oklahoma’s judiciary gives section 1443.1 strength by applying it to
statements reasonably related to communication with a governmental body.
Unfortunately, despite this expansive reading of the statute, targets of SLAPP
suits still receive little protection in Oklahoma. Oklahoma’s statute is
ineffective because its narrow scope limits its applicability to a cause of action
for libel, and it lacks an effective court review process. Like the NoerrPennington Doctrine, the Oklahoma statute merely provides a defense once the
parties get to trial. Consequently, the targets of SLAPP suits must expend
valuable time and resources getting to that point, which in itself is often
enough to chill petitioning activity. Oklahoma’s legislature should amend the
statute to meet the three-part test suggested by scholars Canan and Pring.
Further, the legislature should work to align the statute more closely with other
states’ SLAPP suit remedies such as California’s comprehensive anti-SLAPP
legislation.
A. Narrow Scope
Regardless of how broad the Oklahoma judiciary defines the terms in
section 1443.1, the statute remains strictly limited to defamation cases.
Defamation, however, is only one potential cause of action in which a SLAPP
suit may appear. Oklahoma’s statute fails the first prong of Canan and Pring’s
132.
133.
134.
135.
136.

828 F. Supp. 1515, 1527 (W.D. Okla. 1992).
Id.
Id.
Griffith v. Sw. Bell Tel. Co., 428 F. Supp. 284, 286 (W.D. Okla. 1976).
Johnson v. KFOR, 2000 OK CIV APP 64, ¶ 3, 6 P.3d 1067, 1069.
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test because it does not cover all public advocacy and communications to the
government.137 The statute only applies if a SLAPP filer camouflages a claim
using a defamation cause of action; SLAPP suits, however, frequently appear
in other causes of action such as business torts, conspiracy, civil rights claims,
abuse of process, and malicious prosecution.138 As long as SLAPP suit filers
avoid defamation and instead utilize one of the other common causes of action,
SLAPP suit targets have little statutory protection against the harmful and
often chilling attacks on the right to petition.
To address the problems inherent in the statute’s narrow scope, the
Oklahoma legislature should consider updating the statute to conform to
California and other states’ anti-SLAPP protections. A remarkable twentythree states, every state with an anti-SLAPP statute except Oklahoma, broadly
cover any civil action139 and an updated Oklahoma statute should similarly
acknowledge SLAPP suits beyond the boundaries of libel.140 An anti-SLAPP
statute will only provide sufficient protection for targets of SLAPP suits by
focusing on the actual attack on the right to petition, not the superficial cause
of action.

137. PRING & CANAN, supra note 2, at 189.
138. Id. at 191.
139. While other states’ statutes are not restricted to a particular cause of action, some states
do impose certain limitations. For example, Pennsylvania’s statute only applies to petitions for
environmental issues. 27 PA. CONS. STAT. §§ 7707, 8301-8305 (2000). Rhode Island specifies
that the lawsuit must not be a “sham.” R.I. GEN. LAWS §§ 9-33-1 to -4 (1997). Arkansas,
Delaware, Maine, Massachusetts, Pennsylvania, and Tennessee withhold immunity from
statements that are made with knowledge of falsity. ARK. CODE ANN. §§ 16-63-501 to -508
(2006); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 10, §§ 8136-8138 (2001); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 14, § 556
(2003); MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 231, § 59H (2000); 27 PA. CONS. STAT. §§ 7707, 8301-8305;
TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 4-21-1001 to -1003 (2005). Arkansas and Nevada impose a “good faith”
restriction. ARK. CODE ANN. §§ 16-63-501 to -508; NEV. REV. STAT. §§ 41.635 to .670 (2005).
A “good faith” restriction is not recommended based on the Supreme Court’s decision in
Columbia v. Omni Outdoor Advertising, Inc., 499 U.S. 365 (1991). See PRING & CANAN, supra
note 2, at 193. That decision held that the Constitution protects any advocacy to government
that is designed to have some effect on government decision-making, regardless of the content
or motives. Columbia, 499 U.S. at 380.
140. See, e.g., PRING & CANAN, supra note 2, at 203. Professors Pring and Canan provide
a sample provision made from using effective elements of the Supreme Court’s Omni decision
and California, New York, and Minnesota’s statutes. Id. The sample provision states, in part,
“Acts in furtherance of the constitutional right to petition, including seeking relief, influencing
action, informing, communicating, and otherwise participating in the process of government,
shall be immune from civil liability, regardless of intent or purpose, except where not aimed at
procuring any governmental or electoral action, result, or outcome.” Id.
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B. Lack of an Effective Court Review Process
Like the statute’s narrow scope, the lack of an effective court review
process renders Oklahoma’s statute inadequate to combat SLAPP suits and
their ill effects. Without procedural mechanisms to prevent or cure SLAPP
suits in their infancy, the statute fails the third prong of Canan and Pring’s
test.141 Due to the costs and anxiety associated with lawsuits, lengthy SLAPP
suits discourage targets from continuing their petitioning activities and
intimidate future petitioners for fear of similar retaliation.142 Moreover,
prolonged suits often cause support for the original issues to wane, rendering
the petitioning activities futile.143 Implementing procedures that allow for
quick dispositions of SLAPP suits while discouraging future suits can mitigate
many of these ill effects.144 Unfortunately, Oklahoma’s statute does not
provide a method for early review and dismissal, and is therefore inadequate
to protect petitioning activity.
In addition to Oklahoma’s anti-SLAPP statute, other statutory mechanisms
for combating frivolous suits likewise fail to establish adequate protection for
targets. A motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim generally proves
ineffective as a remedy because filers can easily frame petitioning grievances
in the form of legitimate tort claims.145 Further, targets must still spend
considerable time and money for pre-trial practice and discovery, and even if
the court grants the motion, dismissals do little to deter future SLAPP suits.146
Similarly, motions for sanctions and shifting of attorney fees often increase
total litigation and do little to discourage suing in the first place.147 Motions
such as these may be difficult for targets to invoke and occur too late in the
litigation process to prevent the chill on petitioning.148 Reactionary solutions
may effectively vindicate defendants in ordinary lawsuits, but their impact is
minimal when the purpose of the suit is to intimidate targets through enormous

141. PRING & CANAN, supra note 2, at 189 (“Prevention and cure: It must set out an
effective early review for filed SLAPPs, shifting the burden of proof to the filer and, in so
doing, serving a clear warning against the future filing of such suits.”).
142. See PRING & CANAN, supra note 2, at 10-11; see also Penelope Canan & George W.
Pring, Strategic Lawsuits Against Public Participation, 35 SOC. PROBS. 506, 515 (1988).
143. See generally Canan & Pring, supra note 142, at 515-16; PRING & CANAN, supra note
2, at 10-11; Ralph Michael Stein, SLAPP Suits: A Slap at the First Amendment, 7 PACE ENVTL.
L. REV. 45, 53.
144. Cosentino, supra note 12, at 403.
145. Id. at 415.
146. Id.
147. Id. at 414-21.
148. Id. at 421.
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court costs and time commitments.149 An effective remedy must go beyond
traditional procedures to address the problems unique to the growing SLAPP
suit phenomenon.
Using California’s anti-SLAPP statute as a guide, the Oklahoma legislature
should provide citizens more protection from SLAPP suits by implementing
procedures to establish an adequate court review process. To cure a SLAPP
suit with as little impact on petitioning activity as possible, an effective statute
should include a special motion to dismiss, an articuable burden of proof for
the filer that may include a requirement for more specificity in the pleading,
suspended discovery, and an award of costs to the successfully moving party.
To prevent future SLAPP suits, the statute should include a specific
authorization for serious penalties and accompanying SLAPP-back suits.
Together, these elements provide a quick and cost-effective escape route for
targets of SLAPP suits and may even discourage filers from attacking the
target’s First Amendment Right to Petition in the future.
1. Curing the SLAPP suit
The procedures for curing SLAPP suits are the most important elements in
combating their ill effects and hinge on an early review process.150 Courts
should treat special motions to dismiss as final summary judgment motions
with a time period appropriate for expedited motions.151 As with typical
motions for summary judgment, if a trial court denies the motion or fails to
rule in a speedy fashion, then a moving party should have a right to an
expedited appeal.152 Further, all discovery should be stayed pending a decision
149. See United States v. Lockheed Missiles & Space Co., 190 F.3d 963, 970-71 (9th Cir.
1999) (addressing California’s anti-SLAPP statute in light of the unique goals of SLAPP filers
as opposed to ordinary plaintiffs); see also Stein, supra note 143, at 55 (“[V]irtually always, the
SLAPP plaintiff has no desire to allow the litigation to proceed to the point where NoerrPennington, or any other speech and petition-protectionist doctrine can be applied.”).
150. Okun v. Superior Court, 175 Cal. Rptr. 157, 169 (Cal. Ct. App. 1981) (Mosk, J.,
dissenting) (“In the preservation of the free exercise of speech, writing and the political
function, the early termination of [the] lawsuit is highly desirable. We should discourage
attempts to recover through the judicial process what has been lost in the political process.”).
151. See, e.g., ARK. CODE ANN. §§ 16-63-501 to -508 (2006); CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE §
425.16 (West 2006); GA. CODE ANN. § 9-11-11.1 (2003); HAW. REV. STAT. § 634F (2005); IND.
CODE §§ 34-7-7-1 to -10 (1998); LA. CODE CIV. PROC. ANN. art. 971 (2000); ME. REV. STAT.
ANN. tit. 14, § 556 (2003); MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 231, § 59H (2000); MO. REV. STAT. § 537.528
(Supp. 2006); NEV. REV. STAT. §§ 41.635 to .670 (2005); N.M. STAT. §§ 38-2-9.1 to -9.2 (Supp.
2006); OR. REV. STAT. §§ 31.150 to .155 (2005); R.I. GEN. LAWS §§ 9-33-1 to -4 (1997).
152. See, e.g., ARK. CODE ANN. § 16-63-507 (stating that a hearing on a special motion to
dismiss shall not be conducted more than thirty days after service); MO. REV. STAT. § 537.528
(stating that a motion shall be “considered by the court on a priority or expedited basis to ensure
the early consideration of the issues raised by the motion and to prevent the unnecessary
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on the motion and appeals.153 A method for early review and a stay of
discovery greatly reduces the time commitment and the financial resources
needed to combat the SLAPP suits, thereby lessening the chill effect on
petitioning activity.
To lessen targets’ involvement in SLAPP suits, filers should bear the burden
to prove that the SLAPP suits are legitimate claims.154 Because the suits are
attacks on the Right to Petition, requiring targets to disprove the suits’
legitimacy places the targets in a cumbersome and often unjustified position
of defending their constitutional rights. A burden of proof on filers aligns with
the goals of anti-SLAPP statutes in that it alleviates the time and effort
required to defend frivolous suits, time and effort that could otherwise be spent
focusing on the petitioning activity.155 States employing this burden shifting
often require targets to initiate the motion to dismiss, stating that a suit is an
attack on the target’s First Amendment rights, after which the filers must prove
the claim’s legitimacy.156
While most states with an anti-SLAPP statute agree that the filer should
bear the burden of proof,157 once the burden is set, states differ as to which
standard the courts should use in ruling on the motion to dismiss. In
California, for example, the statute requires the filer to establish a probability
expense of litigation”).
153. Fifteen states include a provision for a stay of discovery. ARK. CODE ANN. §§ 16-63501 to -508; CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 425.16; GA. CODE ANN. § 9-11-11.1; HAW. REV. STAT.
§ 634F; IND. CODE §§ 34-7-7-1 to -10; LA. CODE CIV. PROC. ANN. art. 971; ME. REV. STAT.
ANN. tit. 14, § 556; MD. CODE ANN., CTS. & JUD. PROC. § 5-807 (LexisNexis Supp. 2006);
MINN. STAT. §§ 554.01 to .05 (2000); MO. REV. STAT. § 537.528; NEV. REV. STAT. §§ 41.635
to .670; OR. REV. STAT. §§ 31.150 to .155; 27 PA. CONS. STAT. §§ 7707, 8301-8305 (2000); R.I.
GEN. LAWS §§ 9-33-1 to -4; UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 78-58-101 to -105 (2003).
154. See, e.g., CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 425.16 (stating that when reviewing a special motion
to strike, the plaintiff must establish that there is a probability the plaintiff will prevail on the
claim); MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 231, § 59H (stating that the court should grant a special motion
to dismiss unless the filer shows that the petition was devoid of any reasonable factual support
or arguable basis in law and the petitioning acts caused actual injury to the responding party).
155. Canan, supra note 19, at 30.
156. See, e.g., CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 425.16 (requiring the target to initiate the motion to
dismiss and the filer to assert that the claim is proper, the act in question is not privileged, and
the suit was not meant to suppress speech); N.Y. C.P.L.R. 3211(g) (McKinney 2004) (requiring
the target to prove a petitioning activity and the filer, in turn, to prove there is a substantial basis
in fact and law for the suit).
157. See ARK. CODE ANN. §§ 16-63-501 to -508; CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 425.16; DEL.
CODE ANN. tit. 10, §§ 8136-8138 (2001); GA. CODE ANN. § 9-11-11.1; HAW. REV. STAT. §
634F; LA. CODE CIV. PROC. ANN. art. 971 (2000); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 14, § 556; MASS.
GEN. LAWS ch. 231, § 59H; MINN. STAT. §§ 554.01 to .05; NEB. REV. STAT. §§ 25-21-241 to
-246 (1995); N.Y. C.P.L.R. 3211(g); 12 OKLA. STAT. § 1443.1 (2001); OR. REV. STAT. §§
31.150 to .155.
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that he or she will prevail on the claim.158 Under this standard, the court must
weigh the evidence presented by both sides and determine if the plaintiff is
more likely than not to prevail at trial.159
Opponents of this standard argue that it is unconstitutional because a special
motion to dismiss with a “more likely than not” standard circumvents the right
to a jury trial.160 In the case of a SLAPP suit, the fundamental federal and state
constitutional rights of petition and speech conflict with the state right to a jury
trial;161 however, when two constitutional rights conflict, legislatures have the
power to balance these rights.162 As Mark Goldowitz, the director of the
California Anti-SLAPP Project noted, California’s anti-SLAPP statute strikes
that balance because “there is no constitutional right to a jury trial of a lawsuit
that violates the First Amendment.”163 Moreover, many courts routinely
adjudicate cases in pre-trail motions.164 Currently, the legislatures in
California, Hawaii, Louisiana, and Oregon have all enacted statutes using the
probability standard, and, like traditional motions for summary judgment,
courts have not deemed the standard unconstitutional.165
In addition to the probability standard, some states require courts to
examine the special motion to dismiss based on the standard first articulated
in the Colorado Supreme Court decision of Protect Our Mountain
Environment v. District Court.166 Like California’s probability approach, this
standard also shifts the burden of proof to the filer.167 Further, the filer must
prove that the target’s petitioning was devoid of any reasonable factual support
or any arguable basis in law, and that the target’s petitioning activities caused
actual injury to the filer.168 This approach puts the focus on the target’s
petitioning activities rather than the filer’s suit.169 Thus far, this judicial

158. CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 425.16.
159. Id.
160. See, e.g., Opinion of the Justices (SLAPP Suit Procedure), 641 A.2d 1012, 1015 (N.H.
1994) (advising the New Hampshire legislature that the proposed anti-SLAPP legislation,
modeled off of California’s “probability” standard was unconstitutional because of an expansive
view of New Hampshire’s right to a jury trial).
161. Mark Goldowitz, The Practitioner: Recent Appellate Case Upholds California’s AntiSLAPP Law, L.A. DAILY J., Sept. 27, 1994, at 7.
162. Opinion of the Justices, 641 A.2d at 1015; PRING & CANAN, supra note 2, at 19.
163. Goldowitz, supra note 161, at 7.
164. 10 CYCLOPEDIA OF FEDERAL PROCEDURE § 35.19.10, at 239 (3d ed. 1951).
165. CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 425.16 (West 2006); HAW. REV. STAT. § 634F (2005); LA.
CODE CIV. PROC. ANN. art. 971 (2000); OR. REV. STAT. §§ 31.150 to .155 (2005).
166. Protect Our Mountain Env’t v. District Court, 677 P.2d 1361 (Colo. 1984).
167. Id. at 1369.
168. Id.
169. PRING & CANAN, supra note 2, at 200.
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doctrine has been effective in Colorado, and several other states have
incorporated this standard, at least in part, into anti-SLAPP statutes.170
One potential weakness of the Mountain Environment approach results
when judges are lenient with filers who assert that there are certain facts at
issue that require a trial.171 Generally, judges only dismiss a case if the facts
are either not decisive or not in dispute.172 In a SLAPP suit, filers argue that
subjective terms such as “truth,” “intent,” “motive,” and “good faith,” are at
issue and, therefore, require examination at trial.173 Even if a case does not
proceed to trial, this tactic successfully chills SLAPP suits by prolonging the
suit through discovery.174 While filers commonly argue that a trial is needed
to ascertain certain facts, this strategy should nevertheless be ineffective if an
alert judge recognizes that the only facts at issue are related to the Petition
Clause and petitioning activity and, regardless of intent, should not be
disputable or open to discovery.175
To mitigate the potential problem of opening up a “fact quagmire” using the
substantive test from Mountain Environment, a third and perhaps more
effective standard for review comes from the Supreme Court’s decision in
Columbia v. Omni Outdoor Advertising, Inc.176 According to the Omni
decision, any activity aimed at achieving an actual government decision,
result, or outcome receives immunity from suit.177 In Omni, the Court held that
motives such as bad faith or unreasonable petitioning are irrelevant because
the Constitution protects any effort to influence public officials, regardless of
intent or purpose.178
Three years after the Supreme Court’s Omni decision, Minnesota became
the first state to enact an anti-SLAPP statute using this broad and
straightforward standard.179 Minnesota’s statute provides immunity for any
“lawful conduct or speech that is genuinely aimed in whole or in part at
procuring favorable government action.”180 Under this simplified approach,
170. See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 10, §§ 8136-8138 (2001); GA. CODE ANN. § 9-11-11.1
(2003); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 14, § 556 (2003); MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 231, § 59H (2000);
NEB. REV. STAT. §§ 25-21-241 to -246 (1995); TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 4-21-1001 to -1003
(2005).
171. PRING & CANAN, supra note 2, at 161.
172. Id.
173. Id.
174. Id.
175. Id. at 162.
176. Columbia v. Omni Outdoor Adver., Inc., 499 U.S. 365, 380 (1991).
177. Id.
178. Id.
179. MINN. STAT. §§ 554.01 to .05 (2000).
180. Id. § 554.03.
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the filer bears the burden of proof, as in California’s probability standard and
the Mountain Environment standard, and the filer must prove that the
petitioning was not aimed at procuring favorable government action.181
Statutes like Minnesota’s that articulate a standard of review based on the
straight-forward Omni test align with the Supreme Court’s policy goal of
basing First Amendment protections on foundations other than the petitioner’s
subjective intent.182
Regardless of whether a statute contains a probability standard for the
motion to dismiss or a standard developed from the Mountain Environment or
Omni decisions, every state with an anti-SLAPP statute except Delaware,
Tennessee, Oklahoma, and Washington, includes some form of early review.183
If enacted properly, special motions to dismiss are quick, cheap methods to cut
off harassing discovery and ensure quick closure.184 Unfortunately, however,
a few potential problems undermine their effectiveness.
Motions to dismiss are discretionary motions decided on bare facts
presented in the pleadings.185 Oklahoma, as a notice pleading state, only
requires plaintiffs to include in the pleadings a “short and plain statement of
the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.”186 Judges frequently
enact a “wait and see” approach to allow trials to sort out the facts and avoid
the risk of dismissing legitimate suits.187 If the pleadings fail to indicate
181. Id.
182. See Omni, 499 U.S. at 380; Mine Workers v. Pennington, 381 U.S. 657, 670 (1965)
(“Noerr shields from the Sherman Act a concerted effort to influence public officials regardless
of intent of purpose.”). Arkansas, Georgia, Indiana, Maine, Nevada, New York, Pennsylvania,
Rhode Island, and Washington have enacted some form of the Omni standard, sometimes used
in conjunction with the Mountain Environment standard. ARK. CODE ANN. §§ 16-63-501 to 508 (2006); GA. CODE ANN. § 9-11-11.1 (2003); IND. CODE §§ 34-7-7-1 to -10 (1998); ME.
REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 14, § 556 (2003); NEV. REV. STAT. §§ 41.635 to .670 (2005); N.Y.
C.P.L.R. 3211(g) (McKinney 2004); 27 PA. CONS. STAT. §§ 7707, 8301-8305 (2000); R.I. GEN.
LAWS §§ 9-33-1 to -4 (1997); WASH. REV. CODE §§ 4.24.500 to .520 (2005).
183. ARK. CODE ANN. §§ 16-63-501 to -508; CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 425.16 (West 2006);
DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 10, §§ 8136-8138 (2001); FLA. STAT. § 768.295 (2005); GA. CODE ANN.
§ 9-11-11.1; HAW. REV. STAT. § 634F (2005); IND. CODE §§ 34-7-7-1 to -10; LA. CODE CIV.
PROC. ANN. art. 971 (2000); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 14, § 556; MD. CODE ANN., CTS. & JUD.
PROC. § 5-807 (LexisNexis Supp. 2006); MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 231, § 59H (2000); MINN. STAT.
§§ 554.01 to .05; MO. REV. STAT. § 537.528 (Supp. 2006); NEB. REV. STAT. §§ 25-21-241 to
-246 (1995); NEV. REV. STAT. §§ 41.635 to .670; N.M. STAT. §§ 38-2-9.1 to -9.2 (Supp. 2006);
N.Y. C.P.L.R. 3211(g); OR. REV. STAT. §§ 31.150 to 155 (2005); 27 PA. CONS. STAT. §§ 7707,
8301-8305; R.I. GEN. LAWS §§ 9-33-1 to -4; TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 4-21-1001 to -1003 (2005);
UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 78-58-101 to -105 (2003); WASH. REV. CODE §§ 4.24.500 to .520.
184. PRING & CANAN, supra note 2, at 159.
185. Id. at 157.
186. 12 OKLA. STAT. § 2008 (2001).
187. Id.

https://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/olr/vol60/iss2/5

2007]

NOTE

445

whether the bases of the claims are petitioning activities, judges may be
unlikely to dismiss. Further, motions to dismiss lose their effectiveness if
judges dismisses without prejudice and permit filers leave to amend.188 While
it ordinarily may be reasonable to allow leaves to amend, in cases with
constitutional issues at stake, filers simply cannot re-write the claims to avoid
the constitutional issue.189 In short, allowing leaves to amend in constitutional
cases is a “dereliction of duty on the part of the judge.”190
Oklahoma’s legislature should address these problems by clearly
articulating the statute’s goals to emphasize the need for quick disposal,191 and
by expressly providing that a motion to dismiss is a final judgment to prevent
repetitive and harassing amendments.192 Additionally, the Oklahoma
legislature should address the minimal facts available in the pleadings by
either requiring more specificity in pleadings or supplementing the pleadings
with affidavits. For example, in Arkansas, filers must submit a written
verification with the pleadings if the court can reasonably construe the claims
as against petitioning activity.193 The verification must state that the basis for
188. PRING & CANAN, supra note 2, at 159.
189. Id.
190. Id. Judge Murphy of New York’s Appellate Division notably criticized a trial judge
for denying a motion for summary judgment. Immuno A.G. v. Moor-Jankowski, 537 N.Y.S.2d
129, 137-38 (N.Y. App. Div. 1989). Judge Murphy stated:
The importance of summary adjudication in . . . [SLAPP] litigation cannot be
overemphasized. [These] actions are notoriously expensive to defend, and,
indeed, “The threat of being put to the defense of a lawsuit . . . may be as chilling
to the exercise of First Amendment freedoms as fear of the outcome of the lawsuit
itself.” . . . To unnecessarily delay the disposition of [such an] action is not only
to countenance waste and inefficiency but to enhance the value of such actions as
instruments of harassment and coercion inimical to the exercise of First
Amendment Rights. . . .
XXThat [the trial court judge] . . . was evidently reluctant to apply the ordinary
summary judgment criteria . . . is regrettable. It is disturbing that the [filer] . . .
succeeded in coercing . . . “substantial settlements” from all but one of the original
defendants for the obvious reason that the costs of continuing to defend the action
were prohibitive.
Id. (citations omitted).
191. See, e.g., ARK. CODE ANN. §§ 16-63-501 to -508 (2006); CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE §
425.16 (West 2006); NEB. REV. STAT. § 25-21-241 (1995); N.M. STAT. § 38-2-9.1 (Supp. 2006);
R.I. GEN. LAWS § 9-33-1 (1997); TENN. CODE ANN. § 4-21-1002 (2005); WASH. REV. CODE §§
4.24.500 to .520 (2005).
192. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. § 768.295 (2005) (providing that the court should grant final
judgment in a dismissal action).
193. ARK. CODE ANN. § 16-63-505 (requiring verification for “any claim asserted against
a person or entity arising from possible privileged communication or an act by that person or
entity that could reasonably be construed as an act in furtherance of the right of free speech or
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the claim is not a privileged communication and the claim is not for
suppressing the right to petition.194 California, on the other hand, considers
supporting and opposing affidavits submitted with and in rebuttal to the
motions to dismiss.195 Under either approach, the court may acquire enough
information about the suit to dismiss potential threats to the right to petition
before discovery.
A special motion to dismiss is an important element the Oklahoma
legislature should consider incorporating into Oklahoma’s statute; however,
that by itself is not enough to cure the SLAPP suit problem. An expeditious
motion to dismiss alleviates the burden on the petitioner’s time, but does not
address the petitioner’s financial burden. An effective anti-SLAPP statute
should specify that the filer bear the costs of the suit upon dismissal.
Currently, unlike every other state with an anti-SLAPP statute, Oklahoma’s
statute contains no such provision for cost shifting, even if the defendant
successfully proves his or her actions were immune from suit.196 Including a
cost-shifting element would be consistent with section 2011 of title 12, which
permits judges to make one side pay costs and attorney fees for improper or
frivolous lawsuits.197 If a judge dismisses a SLAPP suit on constitutional
grounds, sanctions are appropriate under section 2011, but by making costshifting automatic in the anti-SLAPP statute, targets would not need to file an
additional motion.
2. Preventing Future SLAPP Suits
Apart from curing SLAPP suits once initiated, legislatures should address
how to prevent SLAPP suits from occurring. Part of an effective court review
process includes a remedy to lessen the attractiveness of filing suit; in short,
the suits should be less economically desirable.198 Consider a situation where
public opposition threatens a real estate development that the developer
the right to petition government for a redress of grievances under the Constitution of the United
States or the Constitution of the State of Arkansas in connection with an issue of public interest
or concern”); see also GA. CODE ANN. § 9-11-11.1 (2003).
194. ARK. CODE ANN. § 16-63-505.
195. CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 425.16; see also FLA. STAT. § 768.295; IND. CODE § 34-7-7-9
(1998); LA. CODE CIV. PROC. ANN. art. 971 (2000); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 14, § 556 (2003);
MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 231, § 59H (2000).
196. 12 OKLA. STAT. § 1443.1 (2001).
197. Id. § 2011.
198. According to one of the only comprehensive studies of SLAPP suits, Professors Canan
and Pring examined 228 SLAPP suits and discovered that business or economically motivated
categories made up 84% of SLAPP filings. Canan & Pring, supra note 142, at 511 tbl.I.
Realistically, some SLAPP suits are motivated by other reasons such as reputation or
vindication and may not be impacted by making the suits less economically attractive. Id.
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estimates to be worth more than the potential costs of a lawsuit. It makes
economic sense for the developer to silence the opposition’s petitioning
activity through a suit in order to protect the development. In response to the
potential for repetitive and chilling lawsuits this situation creates, several states
include provisions in their anti-SLAPP statutes that impose a fine or authorize
a countersuit for damages (SLAPP-back suits).199
A fine for initiating SLAPP suits provides a quick and easy solution to help
discourage future suits. SLAPP suits will continue as long as the suits remain
more economically feasible than allowing the petitioning to continue;
accordingly, a fine that makes SLAPP suits economically infeasible represents
one of the most efficient ways to prevent them.200 Oklahoma’s legislature
should include a provision in the anti-SLAPP statute authorizing courts to
impose substantial fines above the traditional court costs.201 This would
encourage courts to focus on preventing future SLAPP suits rather than merely
compensating a target’s damage.
While a fine has the potential to significantly alter the economic feasibility
of a SLAPP suit, legislatures should employ other forms of prevention as well.
A judge may be reluctant to issue a fine or may set the dollar amount too low
to offset the value of a business deal.202 Legislatures should consider
authorizing SLAPP-back suits, lawsuits filed by SLAPP targets against the
original SLAPP filers, in conjunction with a court-awarded fine.203 Like
California, Oklahoma should include a provision in the anti-SLAPP statute
granting prevailing targets a cause of action against SLAPP filers if a judge
dismisses a SLAPP suit pursuant to a special motion to dismiss.204 These
lawsuits, based on claims for malicious prosecution, abuse of process, or civil

199. ARK. CODE ANN. §§ 16-63-501 to -508; CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 425.16; DEL. CODE
ANN. tit. 10, §§ 8136-8138 (2001); HAW. REV. STAT. § 634F (2005); MINN. STAT. §§ 554.01
to .05 (2000); NEV. REV. STAT. §§ 41.635 to .670 (2005); N.Y. C.P.L.R. 3211(g) (McKinney
2004); R.I. GEN. LAWS §§ 9-33-1 to -4 (1997); UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 78-58-101 to -105 (2003);
WASH. REV. CODE §§ 4.24.500 to .520 (2005).
200. See Cosentino, supra note 12, at 410.
201. See ARK. CODE ANN. § 16-63-506; DEL. CODE. ANN. tit. 10, § 8136; HAW. REV. STAT.
§ 634F-2; MINN. STAT. § 554.04; N.Y. C.P.L.R. 3211(g); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 9-33-2; UTAH CODE
ANN. § 78-58-105; WASH. REV. CODE § 4.24.520. Rhode Island’s anti-SLAPP statute, for
example, states that in addition to costs and fees the court may also grant compensatory
damages and punitive damages upon a showing that the suit was frivolous. R.I. GEN. LAWS §§
9-33-2.
202. PRING & CANAN, supra note 2, at 162.
203. Id. at 168.
204. CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 425.18; NEV. REV. STAT. § 41.670; UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-58105.
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rights violations, have the potential to generate substantial awards, often as
punitive damages.205
California has the most comprehensive SLAPP-back legislation, and, not
surprisingly, some of the most successful SLAPP-back suits.206 In one
particularly successful SLAPP-back suit, a SLAPP target in 1988 won a
thirteen million dollar verdict for three plaintiffs — three million for
compensatory damages and ten million for punitive damages.207 In that case,
three local farmers in southern California supported a ballot proposition that
would create a canal to pipe water from northern California southward.208 A
couple of the largest and richest corporate farmers adamantly opposed this
proposition.209 The corporate farmers, upset by a full-page newspaper
advertisement the local farmers ran supporting the proposition and criticizing
the corporate farmer’s opposition, responded by slapping a $2,500,000 libel
suit on the farmers.210 This suit caused the local farmers to immediately drop
out of the publicity campaign along with other supporters and media outlets
for fear of being included in the suit.211 After a vigorous defense of the libel
suit, the court eventually dismissed the SLAPP suit. The farmers immediately
responded with a SLAPP-back suit.212 Although the original suit and the
SLAPP-back suit took eight years for discovery and trial, a jury decided that
because the corporate farmers had such a high net worth, punitive damages of
$10,500,000 were in order to punish the filers.213 This suit, like many others
with similar results, shows that even though SLAPP-back suits may take
several years to resolve, they are still a valuable strategy that has the potential
to punish wealthy filers and deter future suits.214
After the onset of SLAPP-back suits in California, real estate developers,
polluters, and public officials who previously may have SLAPPed opponents
without hesitation are now thinking twice.215 These suits are often successful
in court, and juries tend to have a field day handing down substantial verdicts
205. Robert I. McMurry & David H. Pierce, Strategic Lawsuits Against Public Participation
(SLAPPs): The Benefits and Risks, in Land Use Institute: Planning, Regulation, Litigation,
Eminent Domain, and Compensation, C750 ALI-ABA 823, 831 (1992).
206. CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 425.18.
207. Edmund Costantini, one of the expert witnesses in the case, provides a detailed
discussion in a published article. Costantini & Nash, supra note 20, at 477-79.
208. Id.
209. Id.
210. Id.
211. Id.
212. Id.
213. Id.
214. PRING & CANAN, supra note 2, at 169.
215. Id.
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against filers.216 Together with fines and sanctions, SLAPP-back suits play an
important part of the court review process to help assuage the detrimental
chilling effect to the First Amendment Right to Petition.
V. Conclusion
The objective of section 1443.1 of Oklahoma’s statute is to safeguard
citizens from attacks on their constitutional right to petition the government.
The result, however, is a statute that provides a reactionary defense to a limited
number of suits, and does nothing to protect a defendant’s time and financial
resources or prevent similar attacks in the future. The right to petition the
government for a redress of grievances is one of the most fundamental liberties
essential to an effective representative government and it deserves attention
and protection from our legislature. Without adequate protections, ordinary
citizens who seek to petition the government are at risk and often fall victim
to lawsuits with the sole objective of oppressing current and future opposition.
Nearly twenty-five years since its enactment, Oklahoma’s statute is in critical
need of an update to address the common and growing phenomenon of these
lawsuits.
To combat the inadequacies of Oklahoma’s statute, Oklahoma’s legislature
should include provisions to protect all public advocacies and provide
remedies to cure the suit and prevent future suits. Filers often disguise suits
against public participation using a variety of causes of action beyond
defamation, and, like every other state with an anti-SLAPP statute, Oklahoma
should expand immunity to public advocacy that results in any retaliatory
lawsuit, regardless of the stated cause of action of that suit. Further,
Oklahoma’s statute should establish procedural mechanisms to lessen the
stress on the target such as a special expedited motion to dismiss with the
burden of proof shifted to the filer of the suit, suspended discovery, and an
award of costs to the moving party. To prevent future suits, the statute should
include a specific authorization for a serious penalty to the filer along with
SLAPP-back suits. Modifying Oklahoma’s statute lessens the detrimental chill
effect that SLAPP suits have on public advocacy and better comports with the
Petition Clause in the First Amendment.
Laura Long

216. Id. (stating that in the 1980s and 1990s, juries have handed down verdicts of
$5,000,000, $9,000,000, $13,000,000, and $86,000,000).
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